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“The whole thing was a very cleverly planned jigsaw 
puzzle, so arranged that every fresh piece of 
knowledge that came to light made the solution of the 
whole more difficult.”—Agatha Christie, Murder on 
the Orient Express. 
 
“It’s like kind of complicated to me”—John Doe, on 
the withdrawal of his § 2255 motion. 
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I. Introduction 
John Doe, whose identity we protect because he is a 
Government informant, appeals from the denial of (1) a 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed in 2012 and (2) a request made in 
2013 to reopen a § 2255 motion filed in 2008.  Doe was 
sentenced pursuant to the then-mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines as a “career offender” on the basis of two 
convictions for simple assault in Pennsylvania.  He argued in 
his 2008 motion that his convictions were not “crimes of 
violence” within the meaning of the Guidelines and thus he 
was not a career offender.  Our precedent foreclosed that 
argument when he made it, but, in light of the Supreme Court 
case Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), we 
reversed ourselves, and Doe’s argument became plausible.  
He therefore filed another § 2255 motion, but it too was 
denied.   
This case presents many procedural complexities of 
first impression within this Circuit.  If Doe can manage the 
Odyssean twists and turns of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), including the Scylla of 
the second-or-successive bar and the Charybdis of the statute 
of limitations, he may find a meritorious claim at the end of 
his journey.  However, we do not definitively reach the merits 
here and instead remand to let Doe’s case continue its 
uncertain course. 
II. Procedural and Legal History 
In 1991 Doe pled guilty in Pennsylvania to cocaine 
possession.  In 1996 and 2000 (also in Pennsylvania), he pled 
guilty to two simple assaults.  In 2003, he pled guilty in 
federal court to distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute at least five grams of crack cocaine in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000).  Doe was 
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sentenced to 262 months’ incarceration pursuant to the then-
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and case law that has since 
been overruled.  This is the sentence he now attacks. 
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a significant 
enhancement for “career offenders,” defined as those with “at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1(a)(3).  Doe’s 1991 drug conviction was not relevant 
to the career-offender designation because it occurred more 
than 10 years before his federal conviction and did not result 
in a sentence longer than one year and one month of 
imprisonment.1  Thus Doe was a career offender only if both 
of his prior assaults were “crime[s] of violence.”  Id. 
§ 4B1.1(a)(3).  His sentence in 2003 occurred under our case 
law categorically designating simple assault in Pennsylvania 
as a crime of violence, and hence Doe was a career offender.  
United States v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1999).  
He was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment, the bottom 
of the Guidelines range, and did not appeal.  Without the 
career-offender enhancement, Doe’s Guidelines range would 
                                              
1 See U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(c)(2) (offenses must be counted under 
§ 4A1.1’s calculation of criminal history points in order to 
count for career offender purposes); § 4A1.1 Commentary 
(cross-referencing § 4A1.2 for instructions on how to 
compute criminal history points); § 4A1.2(e)(2) (excluding 
from calculation offenses for which the sentence received is 
less than one year and a month and that occurred more than 
ten years before the offense conduct to which the defendant is 
being sentenced).   
  
6 
 
have been 110–137 months, with a mandatory minimum of 
10 years.2  U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A (2002).  
In 2004 the Government filed a motion to reduce 
Doe’s sentence because he provided “substantial assistance” 
to the Government in a different criminal investigation.  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 35(b).  The Government requested that the 
District Court hold the motion in abeyance while the 
investigation was ongoing, which the Court did.  While the 
Rule 35 motion was still pending, Doe filed a § 2255 motion 
arguing in part that his simple assault convictions were not 
crimes of violence and that he was therefore wrongly 
sentenced as a career offender. 
On April 16, 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay, 
which held that a DUI conviction is not a “violent felony” 
within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA) because it does not involve “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.”  553 U.S. at 145.  The words and 
structure of the career-offender Sentencing Guideline are 
similar to the ACCA’s.  This holding thus significantly 
strengthened Doe’s argument (which otherwise would have 
certainly failed because of Dorsey), as the subsection of 
Pennsylvania’s assault statute to which Doe pled guilty 
                                              
2 Doe faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years 
based on his 1991 conviction for cocaine possession.  21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000).  Although, as explained 
above, not relevant to his Guidelines calculation, Doe’s 1991 
conviction set his minimum statutory sentence, as older 
sentences for drug crimes involving small amounts of 
contraband still count as prior convictions that trigger 
mandatory minimums under the Controlled Substances Act. 
Id. 
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proscribes intentional (i.e., purposeful), knowing and reckless 
conduct.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1) & (a)(2).  Yet, 
panels of this Court continued to apply Dorsey in 
nonprecedential opinions.  E.g., United States v. Wolfe, 301 F. 
App’x 134 (3d Cir. 2008). 
The District Court appointed the Federal Defenders to 
represent Doe on collateral review.  On April 16, 2009, one 
year to the day from Begay (and thus the last day of 
AEDPA’s limitations period within which Doe could make an 
argument attacking his sentence based on that decision, see 
28 U.S.C. 2255(f)), the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing on both the Rule 35(b) and the § 2255 motions. 
It indicated that it would grant Rule 35 relief but 
would not vacate the sentence under § 2255, and Doe’s 
counsel withdrew the § 2255 motion.  Throughout the 
hearing, a crucial factor for everyone was how to keep 
confidential that Doe was cooperating with the authorities; if 
his cooperation got out, he would have been in danger from 
other inmates.  The Court and counsel engaged in a lengthy 
colloquy about whether they were proceeding on Doe’s 
§ 2255 motion or the Government’s Rule 35 motion.  
Eventually, Doe’s lawyer proposed the following. 
MR. LIVINGSTON [Doe’s counsel]:  Your 
Honor, what I can do at sidebar is withdraw [the 
§ 2255 motion], but when I was asking, for the 
public portion of this record, the reason I made 
that request and the reason why I said the things 
I said of public record were mostly for Mr. 
Doe’s[3] safety.  When he explained—what he 
                                              
3 We do not note in this opinion where we have altered Doe’s 
name. 
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explained to me is that he is fully expecting that 
the Court is going to enter a sentence today that 
is greater than time served and that he’s going 
to go back to the federal place from which he 
came, and that inmates there, if they find out 
that he is now serving a lesser term of 
imprisonment will suspect that he came in here 
on a 35(b) motion.  So, without of record 
formally withdrawing the motion, what I can 
say at sidebar is that Mr. Doe is not expecting 
relief under the 2255 vehicle. 
THE COURT:  But I think we have a problem 
then, I do, because I’m not going to grant the 
relief under 2255.  I’m glad to grant it under 
35(b) and I’m glad to keep that under seal, but I 
am not finding today that he’s not a career 
offender and that his criminal history 
calculation in the presentence report 
overrepresented the actual severity of his past 
criminal history.  So, I mean I think to do that, I 
almost have to say then that he’s really not a 
career offender because I have to give those 
past offenses less weight and take him out of 
that status, and I don’t find that to be true. 
 So I don’t know how we accomplish that 
because that’s the basis of my relief today.  The 
basis of my relief is . . . the government having 
filed a 35(b) motion and telling me what they 
have told me today. 
There followed further discussion on how to seal proceedings, 
and the Court addressed the defendant: 
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THE COURT:  Mr. Doe, do you have any 
questions at all about what we’ve just been 
talking about here? 
THE DEFENDANT:  It’s like kind of 
complicated to me. 
THE COURT:  If you want to have a little bit of 
time to speak with Mr. Livingston, you 
certainly can. 
THE DEFENDANT:  I would appreciate that. 
(Whereupon, there was a brief pause in the 
proceedings.) 
MR. LIVINGSTON:  I’ve had an opportunity to 
discuss the procedures that we’ve just been 
going through here with Mr. Doe, and on his 
behalf, what I’m going to do formally is move 
to withdraw his pro se 2255. 
The Court then granted the Rule 35(b) motion and reduced 
Doe’s sentence by about seven years. 
On May 5, 2009, Doe appealed from the grant of the 
Rule 35(b) motion, arguing that he was entitled to further 
reduction because of his wrongful classification as a career 
offender under the Guidelines.  While that appeal was 
pending, we decided United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 
(2009), which overruled Dorsey in light of Begay and held 
that courts must inquire into the part of the statute to which 
the defendant actually pled guilty in order to determine 
whether the career-offender enhancement applies.  If the 
defendant pled guilty to “an intentional or knowing violation 
of” Pennsylvania’s assault statute, he has committed “a crime 
of violence” within the meaning of the career-offender 
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sentencing guideline.  Id. at 212.  In looking to the part of the 
statute to which a defendant pled, courts are restricted to the 
“Shepard materials,” namely, “the statutory definition, 
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to 
which the defendant assented.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 
U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 
Shortly after our Court’s decision in Johnson, Doe 
filed a motion to remand his appeal to the District Court, 
which we denied.  When we ruled on the merits of his appeal, 
we erroneously stated that Doe would be able to bring his 
Begay claim in a timely § 2255 motion based on our mistaken 
conclusion that the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until a new right is deemed retroactive on collateral review.  
United States v. Doe, No. 09-2265, slip op. at 11 (3d. Cir. 
2012) (sealed).  In fact, the statute begins to run from the date 
the new right is recognized.  Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 
353, 360 (2005).  In any event, we affirmed the sentence and 
held that Rule 35 was not an appropriate means for Doe to 
attack his underlying sentence.  
After our opinion on appeal from the Rule 35 
proceedings, in 2012 Doe filed a § 2255 motion, again raising 
his Begay argument.  The statute of limitations for a § 2255 
motion is one year, and, as stated above, begins to run the 
date a new right is recognized.  Therefore, the statute of 
limitations on Doe’s Begay argument expired on April 16, 
2009, the day his lawyer withdrew his 2008 § 2255 motion.  
The District Court concluded that there was no basis to toll 
the limitations period for the 2012 motion and, in the 
alternative, that the 2012 motion was an impermissible 
second § 2255 motion.  Doe filed a motion for 
reconsideration, arguing that the withdrawal in 2009 of his 
2008 § 2255 motion was involuntary due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The District Court appointed new 
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counsel, who in 2013 filed a “supplemental” § 2255 motion 
and requested that the District Court either reinstate the 2008 
pro se motion or equitably toll the statute of limitations for 
the 2012 motion. (The parties treat the 2012 motion and the 
2013 supplemental motion collectively as one motion filed in 
2012, and we do the same.)  The District Court again held 
that there was no basis for equitable tolling and also 
concluded that, because § 2255 counsel was not deficient 
under Strickland, the 2008 motion should not be reinstated. 
Doe appeals. 
III. Summary of Our Decision 
Doe’s case is unusually complex, even in the already 
intricate and technical areas of law under § 2255 and its 
cousin habeas corpus.  We therefore begin with an overview 
of the questions we face and our bottom-line holdings.  
Readers uninitiated in the mysteries of collateral review will 
find the following paragraphs opaque; we hope the rest of our 
opinion clarifies them. 
To reiterate, Doe’s central claim is that he was 
sentenced as a career offender on the basis of two convictions 
for assault that should not have been considered.  When he 
first raised this claim, our case law labeled it a loser, but the 
argument gained strength after the Supreme Court ruled in 
Begay. 
Although Doe has been released from prison, we first 
hold that Doe’s case is not moot, as it is sufficiently likely 
that, if he wins, the District Court will shorten his term of 
supervised release.  Next, we consider whether Doe has made 
the substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right 
that entitles him to appeal even though Begay was not 
explicitly a constitutional decision.  We conclude that we 
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have jurisdiction to issue a certificate of appealability (COA); 
we then issue one on three threshold issues. We further decide 
that even though Doe’s claim is arguably not cognizable on 
collateral review, we have jurisdiction over the case, as 
cognizability is not always a jurisdictional limit. 
Secure in our jurisdiction, we turn to the issues on 
which we grant the COA and assume without deciding that 
Doe’s 2012 § 2255 motion is not a second or successive 
motion over which the District Court lacked jurisdiction.  We 
do so because, even if the 2008 motion did not count as Doe’s 
first, the 2012 motion would have been untimely and the 
circumstances of this case do not call for tolling the statute of 
limitations.   
Then we consider whether Doe was entitled to 
reinstate his 2008 motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60.  Concluding that this is a question properly left 
to the District Court’s sound discretion, we remand on this 
ground. 
To make sure that our remand is not a waste of time, 
we consider other potential bars to collateral relief.  We hold 
that Doe has not procedurally defaulted his claim and that in 
any event the Government has waived this affirmative 
defense.  We then accept the Government’s concession that 
Begay applies retroactively.  Next, we hold that claims of 
Begay error are cognizable on collateral review at least where 
they are not defaulted and the § 2255 movant was sentenced 
under the mandatory Guidelines.  Finally, we acknowledge 
that, even if Doe is unsuccessful in reinstating his 2008 
§ 2255 motion, he may be able to pursue the rare petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
We proceed to put some flesh on these bones. 
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IV. Standards of Review and Jurisdiction 
We review legal determinations de novo, factual 
findings for clear error, and matters committed to the District 
Court’s discretion for abuse thereof. 
There are four jurisdictional questions in this case.  
First, the Government argues that Doe’s appeal is moot 
because he is currently serving the supervised release portion 
of his sentence, which may not be reduced even if Doe 
prevails on the merits.  The next question is whether we have 
jurisdiction to grant a COA.  If we do, we reach the third 
question, which is whether we should in fact grant a COA so 
that we have jurisdiction over the merits of the case.  Finally, 
we raise nostra sponte (that is, on our own) the question of 
whether, if Begay error is not cognizable in a § 2255 
proceeding, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 
A. Mootness 
The Government has moved to dismiss Doe’s appeal 
as moot because, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and 
851, he must serve eight years of supervised release 
regardless of the merits of his appeal.  Even if it turns out that 
he was incarcerated too long, the Government argues that no 
relief is available to him because removing the career-
offender designation will not affect his supervised release.   
In circumstances similar to this case, where a § 2255 
movant on supervised release appealed the length of his 
imprisonment, we observed that the District Court could 
credit him with the time served in prison exceeding a lawful 
sentence and reduce the length of his supervised release by 
that amount.  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 155 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Likewise here, that Doe’s eight-year 
supervised release term is statutorily required is no obstacle to 
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our jurisdiction because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
35(b), under which Doe was sentenced, “authorizes a district 
court to reduce any aspect of a defendant’s [otherwise 
statutorily mandated] sentence, including supervised release 
terms.”  United States v. Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 
2005).4  Because the District Court may reduce the duration 
of Doe’s supervised release if he prevails, the case is not 
moot. 
                                              
4 The Government, in a petition for panel rehearing, argued 
that the “putative availability to Doe of a wholly separate 
procedural route to redress in the form of Rule 35(b) has no 
bearing on whether the instant matter is moot” because Doe’s 
Rule 35(b) proceedings are “closed and final.” Pet. for Panel 
Rehearing at 11. In essence, the Government’s argument is 
that Rule 35(b) cannot help Doe in the current case because 
the challenge here is to his initial sentence, not to his sentence 
as modified by the closed Rule 35(b) proceedings. However, 
this overlooks that, if Doe prevails, it would necessarily mean 
that the District Court used an unlawful sentence as a starting 
point for its Rule 35(b) reduction. Because that reduction was 
intertwined with Doe’s initial sentence, the District Court 
would have the authority to vacate both and revisit them de 
novo as part of its resentencing. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 639 
F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that “common sense 
dictates” that de novo resentencing should be available where 
there is a need to “reconstruct the sentencing architecture” 
after one component of an interrelated sentencing scheme is 
vacated) (quoting United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 
(3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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B. Jurisdiction to Grant a COA 
The motions panel that referred Doe’s COA request to 
our (merits) panel directed the parties to brief whether we 
have jurisdiction to issue a COA.  This phrasing bundles two 
distinct questions: whether we have jurisdiction to entertain 
Doe’s request for a COA; and, if we grant a defective COA, 
whether that would deprive us of jurisdiction over the appeal. 
We clearly have jurisdiction to consider Doe’s 
application for a COA, as an appeal may be taken to a court 
of appeals if “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).  A COA is a 
“jurisdictional prerequisite” to an appeal on the merits.  
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).  “The COA 
statute establishes procedural rules and requires a threshold 
inquiry into whether the circuit court may entertain an 
appeal.”  Id. (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482 
(2000), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 248 (1998)).  
Section 2253 unambiguously gives us jurisdiction—as a panel 
or individually as circuit judges—over the threshold inquiry.  
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (“Congress 
placed the power to issue COAs in the hands of a ‘circuit 
justice or judge.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)). 
As a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal, 
it was until recently arguable that a defective COA fails to 
give a court jurisdiction over the merits of a case.   United 
States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), 
overruled by Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. 641.  A COA is defective if 
it is issued where the applicant has made no “substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(2).  Here, Doe’s most substantial claim is that the 
sentencing Court applied an incorrect (but not in itself 
unconstitutional) interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Therefore, the case could be made that any COA here would 
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be defective, as Doe has failed to make the required showing 
of the denial of a constitutional right.5  Under Cepero, if the 
COA were defective, we would lack jurisdiction over the 
appeal.  However, in Gonzalez the Supreme Court clarified 
that § 2253(c)(2) is not a jurisdictional statute.  132 S. Ct. at 
649.  Therefore, even if we issued a defective COA, it would 
still give us jurisdiction over the appeal. 
We thus have jurisdiction to decide whether to grant 
the COA.  It is also settled that we should not grant the COA 
unless Doe has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.  Furthermore, even if we erroneously 
granted a COA over a non-constitutional issue, we would still 
have jurisdiction over the appeal.  The next question is 
whether we should in fact grant the COA, giving us 
jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal. 
C. Should We Grant a COA? 
Section 2253(c)(2) provides that “[a] certificate of 
appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has held that, as here,  
                                              
5 As discussed immediately below in Part III.C, it was 
arguably unconstitutional to sentence Doe according to the 
erroneous interpretation of the Guidelines because it is 
unconstitutional to punish someone more severely than the 
law allows; however, if the Guidelines in fact meant what the 
sentencing Court thought they did, there would be no 
constitutional infirmity in Doe’s sentence.  
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[w]hen the district court denies a habeas 
petition[6] on procedural grounds without 
reaching the prisoner’s underlying 
constitutional claim, a COA should issue when 
the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of 
reason would find it debatable whether the 
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 
constitutional right and that jurists of reason 
would find it debatable whether the district 
court was correct in its procedural ruling. 
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is some debate as to 
whether “constitutional” in § 2253(c)(1) means 
“constitutional” or “federal.”  2 Randy Hertz & James S. 
Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure 
§ 35.4b[i] & n.33 (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter FHCPP] 
(collecting cases).  This is because, pre-AEDPA, to obtain a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal (the term for what is 
now a COA), an applicant needed to make a substantial 
showing of the denial of a federal right.  Barefoot v. Estelle, 
463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983).  The Supreme Court since held, in 
Slack v. McDaniel, that § 2253(c) codified that standard.  529 
U.S. at 483.  In doing so, the Slack Court expressed “due note 
for the substitution of the word ‘constitutional’” for “federal.”  
Id.  However, the Court did not engage in extended 
discussion about whether the change was meaningful.  See 
                                              
6 There are significant overlaps between the law of habeas 
corpus and motions to vacate, set aside, or correct sentences 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  In quoting cases from the habeas 
context, we do not address the differences from § 2255 law 
except where they are relevant to this appeal. 
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Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 678 (2005) (per curiam) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  We have held that the change was 
meaningful.  Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 80–81 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Cepero, 224 F.3d at 265–68.  Hence, to obtain a 
COA, Doe must make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right; a mere federal right will not do.7 
                                              
7 Cepero went further than saying we may not hear appeals 
from denials of collateral relief when the appellant only 
brings federal claims that are non-constitutional; we also held 
that we may not hear an appeal on any such  claim even when 
the appellant has made a substantial showing of the denial of 
an independent constitutional right (for example, under 
Cepero, if a § 2255 movant makes a substantial showing of 
both a Brady violation and a non-constitutional sentencing 
error, the movant may appeal only the Brady issue).  But see 
Ramunno v. United States, 264 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“If the case presents a substantial constitutional question, 
then an independently substantial statutory issue may come 
along for the ride.  This is one holding of Slack.”).   
 We need not decide whether this aspect of Cepero 
survives Gonzalez.  Our case held that we have no jurisdiction 
over appeals from denials of statutory claims.  After 
Gonzalez, we clearly have jurisdiction, but it is still an open 
question whether § 2253(c)(1) bars appellants without any 
constitutional claims or bars all non-constitutional claims on 
appeal even if a constitutional claim is alongside.  On this 
point Cepero is difficult to reconcile with Slack (which held 
that a petitioner may appeal from an adverse non-
constitutional procedural decision, 529 U.S. 483–84), and 
Gonzalez may be read to undermine Cepero significantly, but 
Doe’s case does not actually present the question because his 
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One important qualification is in order: even though an 
appellant must make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right to get a COA, this aspect of our threshold 
inquiry is satisfied even if the claim is only debatably 
constitutional.  In Hunter v. United States, 559 F.3d 1188, 
1190 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit denied a COA 
because Begay was not a constitutional decision.  However, 
the Supreme Court vacated that judgment in light of the 
position in the Solicitor General’s brief, which argued the 
proper approach would “encompass[] review of ‘debatably 
constitutional’ claims.”  See Br. of Solicitor General 9, 
Hunter v. United States, No. 09-122, 2009 WL 4099534 
(Nov. 25, 2009); Hunter v. United States, 558 U.S. 1143 
(2010).  The Solicitor General’s position is consistent with 
Slack’s characterization of the decision to grant or deny a 
COA as a threshold inquiry.  The contrary stance, requiring 
the claim at issue to be constitutional beyond debate, would in 
close cases require something approaching a merits decision 
at the supposedly threshold COA phase.  In this context, we 
hold that Doe may be granted a COA even if Begay is only 
arguably (to be clear, plausibly or subject to good faith 
debate) a decision of constitutional dimension.  See United 
States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000) (issuing 
a COA because, at the time defendant’s § 2255 motion was 
filed, the constitutional issue was debatable, even though by 
the time of appeal the Supreme Court had resolved it against 
defendant’s position); see also Hunter, 558 U.S. 1143. 
So we come to another threshold question in this case: 
is Doe entitled to a COA?  There are three predicate 
                                                                                                     
only substantial claim is the Begay violation; either the Begay 
claim is constitutional or it’s not, and we need not decide 
whether it can “tag along” with a clearly constitutional claim. 
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questions: could jurists of reason debate whether (1) Begay is 
constitutional as applied through the Sentencing Guidelines; 
(2) Doe has stated a valid claim of Begay error; and (3) the 
District Court rightly decided Doe’s motion? 
1. Begay’s        Arguably       Constitutional 
   Dimension  
Debate is currently fervid across the circuits on 
whether Begay is a constitutional decision; we have yet to 
weigh in.  Supporting Doe’s position are Narvaez v. United 
States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011), and Whiteside v. United 
States, 748 F.3d 541, 548 (4th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 
775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 2890 (2015), both of which held that erroneously 
classifying someone as a career criminal under the mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines arguably violates the Due Process 
Clause by conferring a longer sentence than the law allows.  
The Government argues that in this case Doe’s classification, 
even if erroneous, did not result in an illegally long sentence 
(and thus comported with due process) because the top of the 
relevant statutory sentencing range (life imprisonment) is 
higher than the sentence he received (262 months).  Narvaez 
rejected that argument, as the career offender enhancement 
created a legal presumption that [Narvaez] was 
to be treated differently from other offenders 
because he belonged in a special category 
reserved for the violent and incorrigible.  No 
amount of evidence in mitigation or extenuation 
could erase that branding or its effect on his 
sentence. . . .  The sentencing court’s 
misapplication of the then-mandatory § 4B1.1 
career offender categorization in Mr. Narvaez’s 
case was the lodestar to its guidelines 
calculation.  
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674 F.3d at 629 (emphasis in original). 
A panel of the Fourth Circuit held that 
miscategorization as a career offender worked a “complete 
miscarriage of justice” without deciding whether it also 
violated the Due Process Clause.  Whiteside, 748 F.3d at 548.  
In granting the COA, however, the Court made a threshold 
inquiry about whether the erroneous designation worked a 
constitutional deprivation and was “satisfied that . . . it [was] 
at least debatable that erroneous application of the career 
offender enhancement deprived Whiteside of his liberty in 
violation of his due process rights.”  Id. at 555. 
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held in 
Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), that: Begay’s analysis of the language used in 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 presented an “ordinary question[] of 
[G]uideline interpretation;” because Sun Bear’s sentence was 
within the District Court’s statutory authority to impose, “no 
miscarriage of justice is at issue;” and the claim, far from 
being constitutional, was not even cognizable in a § 2255 
case.  The District Court in Sun Bear had granted a COA, and 
neither the panel nor the en banc Circuit Court discussed 
whether the COA was defective. 
The Supreme Court has stressed that the decision to 
grant a COA is a “threshold inquiry” into whether “jurists of 
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution 
. . . or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are 
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).  Given the 
live debate in several circuits about whether Begay error in a 
sentencing case violates the Constitution, a debate that has 
resulted in a circuit split and at least two rehearings en banc, 
we join the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in holding that, 
whatever the final outcome, Begay error is debatably 
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constitutional, and therefore the word “constitutional” in 
§ 2253(c)(2) is no bar to a COA in this case. 
2. Doe’s   Arguably    Meritorious    Begay  
   Claim 
Next, we must analyze whether “jurists of reason 
would find it debatable whether [Doe’s motion] states a valid 
claim of” Begay error.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.  This is easy—
Doe was sentenced as a career offender because of two 
simple assault convictions.  A career offender is someone 
who has been convicted of at least two crimes of violence.  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Simple assault is not categorically a crime 
of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines; rather, only 
knowing or intentional assaults are.  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 
210–211 & n.8.8  In deciding whether a defendant pled guilty 
to a knowing or intentional assault, we are “generally limited 
to examining the statutory definition, charging document, 
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any 
                                              
8 Because the Government conceded in Johnson that reckless 
assault did not qualify as a crime of violence, we saw no need 
to decide whether Begay overruled our prior holding that 
“purely reckless crimes may count as predicate offenses for 
purposes of career offender guideline.”  Dorsey, 174 F.3d at 
333.  We did, however, note that “Begay . . . made plain that 
only ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct’ may 
constitute a violent felony . . . [and] distinguished that sort of 
conduct from . . . ‘a crime of negligence or recklessness.’”  
Johnson, 587 F.3d at 211 n.8 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 
144–46).  The Government also concedes here that reckless 
conduct is not a crime of violence, Gov’t Br. at 70, and we 
agree for the reasons quoted from Begay in Johnson. 
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explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”  Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.  We have also 
held that a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) can be a 
Shepard document when the defendant does not object to a 
factual account of a crime therein.  United States v. Siegel, 
477 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2007).9 
The Shepard materials in the record before us do not 
establish that Doe pled guilty to knowing or intentional 
conduct.  We have the statutory definition of simple assault, 
the criminal information for Doe’s first assault, the plea 
colloquies for both of Doe’s assaults, and Doe’s PSR in this 
case to which he did not object.  A person is guilty of simple 
assault in Pennsylvania if he “attempts to cause or 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another” or if he “negligently causes bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1) & 
(a)(2).  To be guilty of intentional or knowing assault, the 
defendant must “intend[] to impair the victim’s physical 
condition or cause her substantial pain.”  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 
212.  Doe’s information tracks the language of the statute’s 
first subsection and says that he “intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly caused injury to another, namely David Amon to 
wit: by spitting on him in the face and slapping him in the left 
cheek area causing pain, redness and swelling to the left 
cheek area.”  App. 51.  At the plea colloquy, the only 
                                              
9  In Johnson, 587 F.3d at 212, n.10, we declined, despite 
Siegel, to consider factual matter in an unobjected-to PSR on 
the ground that the document provided no basis to determine 
the defendant’s mens rea.  We need not attempt to resolve 
any tension between Johnson and Siegel, as the description of 
Doe’s actions here does not provide an adequate basis to hold 
that he pled guilty to knowing or intentional assault. 
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reference to Doe’s conduct was a question by the prosecutor, 
“Do you admit that you did strike him,” and Doe’s answer, 
“Yes.”  Tr. 12:17–19, App. 64.  The PSR, to which Doe did 
not object, states roughly the same set of facts for Doe’s 
second assault conviction as the information that Doe slapped 
the victim in the face and spat on him (the PSR adds that he 
spat a second time).  This factual recitation is insufficient to 
hold that Doe’s conduct was knowing or intentional.  
Slapping someone in the face and spitting are not violent 
enough for us to conclude that Doe must have intended to 
“impair the victim’s physical condition or cause [him] 
substantial pain.”  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 212.  Therefore, it 
appears that Doe has at most one conviction for a crime of 
violence within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
For these reasons, Doe likely was not a career 
offender, and, at a minimum, jurists of reason would at least 
find it debatable whether Doe has stated a valid Begay claim. 
3. The  District  Court’s  Arguably  Wrong  
   Procedural Holdings 
Third, we must determine whether jurists of reason 
would find it debatable that the District Court correctly 
dismissed Doe’s motion as second or successive, denied his 
request for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, and 
denied Rule 60 relief that would have reinstated Doe’s timely 
2008 motion that also challenged his career offender status.  
The District Court evaluated all three issues through the lens 
of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, deciding that, 
because counsel was not ineffective in withdrawing the 2008 
motion, the 2012 motion was a second motion, and neither 
equitable tolling nor Rule 60 relief was available.  We explore 
these points in greater detail below, but for the threshold 
COA question it is enough to note that the District Court 
engaged in the wrong analysis.  Whether the 2012 motion was 
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a second motion depends on why the 2008 motion was 
withdrawn, not on whether it was a legitimate strategic 
choice.  See Thai v. United States, 391 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 
2004) (per curiam).  As for equitable tolling and Rule 60, 
both require courts to inquire into the totality of the 
circumstances; counsel’s ineffectiveness may be one factor, 
but it is not necessarily determinative. 
4. Conclusion With Respect to COA 
For the reasons discussed above, we grant Doe a COA 
on whether the District Court properly ruled that (1) his 2012 
motion was his second, (2) he was not entitled to equitable 
tolling on his 2012 motion, and (3) he was not entitled to 
reinstate his 2008 motion. 
D. Cognizability as a Jurisdictional Limit 
The Government contends that Begay error is not 
cognizable on collateral review because it is not of 
constitutional magnitude.  Assuming for the moment the 
Government is correct, we do not believe (nor does the 
Government argue) that this sort of cognizability limitation is 
also a jurisdictional one.  But, as we have a duty to be sure we 
have power to decide the case, we pause to consider any 
potential jurisdictional implications.   
Sometimes habeas petitioners and § 2255 movants 
bring claims that are not cognizable on collateral review, and 
judges conclude they lack jurisdiction over those claims.  
E.g., Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir. 
2012); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1009 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (en banc) (Kozinski, J. dissenting).  
Other courts have indicated that cognizability is not 
jurisdictional.  United States v. Fung, 935 F.2d 276, mem. at 
2 (9th Cir. 1991) (not precedential) (per curiam).  These 
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strands of case law are harmonized when we recognize that 
collateral review courts lack jurisdiction if applicants seek 
unavailable remedies.  A habeas court may lack jurisdiction 
over a claim that does not challenge the fact, duration, or 
conditions of confinement because the court is powerless to 
afford the proper remedy for the claim, like damages (as 
available collateral remedies are generally release or vacating 
a conviction or sentence, or some combination of the 
foregoing, see 2 FHCPP § 33.1).  In Article III terms, certain 
claims are not redressable on collateral review, and thus the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over them.  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
Doe’s claim is not the sort of non-redressable claim 
over which collateral courts lack jurisdiction.  He seeks to 
correct his sentence, and therefore he is properly proceeding 
under § 2255.  If his claim is not cognizable, then he has 
failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, but he 
properly invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction.  Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946).  This distinction is not all 
that important to Doe’s case, but as a general matter it is more 
than semantic because, were cognizability always 
jurisdictional, courts would have to raise the issue sua sponte.  
If a movant brings a non-cognizable sentencing issue and the 
Government only argues that the movant loses on the merits, 
a court may afford relief (if the movant’s position is correct) 
regardless whether the Government could have persuasively 
argued that the claim was non-cognizable.  By contrast, if a 
habeas petitioner seeks damages, notwithstanding the 
Government’s position, a district court would lack authority 
to redress the claimed harm. 
Because cognizability is not a jurisdictional bar in this 
case, it is discussed below after other procedural hurdles. 
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V. Did the 2008 Motion Count Such That Any Later 
Motion Was Second or Successive?  
In general, federal defendants get two conceptual bites 
at the apple of relief from criminal charges: first at trial (and 
appeal therefrom), and second by a motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the first 
step in what is known as “collateral review” of a trial and 
pretrial proceedings (the appeal from a guilty verdict is 
“direct review”).  After an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, there 
is very little a defendant may plausibly ask a court to do; 
particularly relevant here, a defendant may not present a court 
with a second or “successive” (i.e., third, fourth, etc.) § 2255 
motion except in rare circumstances.  Thus, the next threshold 
question in this case is whether Doe’s 2012 § 2255 motion is 
an impermissible second or successive one.   
AEDPA (and, to a lesser extent, pre-AEDPA case law) 
puts a very high barrier between movants and relief on “[a] 
claim presented in a second or successive” motion.  28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2244(a), (b) & 2255(h).  To oversimplify, relief on a 
second or successive motion is only available when the 
Supreme Court makes a new rule of constitutional law 
retroactive to cases on collateral review or when newly 
discovered evidence clearly shows the movant is factually 
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.  Doe meets 
neither condition; hence he cannot file a second or successive 
§ 2255 motion. 
Doe’s is literally his second § 2255 motion, but 
“second or successive” is a term of art; the second-or-
successive bar does not apply to all § 2255 motions that are 
filed after an initially filed motion.  Panetti v. Quarterman, 
551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007) (“[‘Second or successive’] takes 
its full meaning from our case law, including decisions 
predating [AEDPA].”).  To figure out whether the 2012 
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motion, numerically Doe’s second, was also legally his 
second, we need to decide whether the 2008 motion 
“counted” as his first even though it was withdrawn.  We do 
not have a precedential opinion addressing the precise 
question here: when does a voluntarily withdrawn § 2255 
motion or habeas petition “count” so that a numerically 
second motion or petition will be deemed a “second or 
successive” filing within the meaning of § 2244? 
Even though the second-or-successive bar is 
jurisdictional, see Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 
(2007), we need not decide whether Doe’s 2012 motion was 
his second because, even if it was, AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations bars the motion.  See Olson v. United States, 953 
F. Supp. 2d 223, 229 (D.D.C. 2013) (relying on Sinochem 
Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 
(2007)), to dismiss case on statute-of-limitations grounds 
without deciding jurisdictional issue).  As such, we assume 
the 2012 motion was Doe’s first, and he hops out of the 
second-or-successive frying pan into the statute-of-limitations 
fire. 
VI. Statute of Limitations 
The limitations period ran in 2009, one year after the 
Supreme Court decided Begay, and Doe’s motion was filed in 
2012.  See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 360 (2005).  
Therefore, the motion is barred unless the limitations period 
is tolled. 
The District Court erroneously analyzed the equitable 
tolling question, concluding that, because Doe’s § 2255 
counsel was not ineffective within the meaning of Strickland, 
equitable tolling was inappropriate.  The correct standard is 
that equitable tolling is available when a movant shows “(1) 
that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 
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some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 
prevented timely filing.”  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 
649 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Doe has diligently pursued his rights.  He filed his 
Begay claim one month before the case came down; he 
withdrew his § 2255 motion without any obvious indication 
that he was abandoning the Begay claim.  He raised Begay on 
appeal; when we issued Johnson, he sought remand to the 
District Court to litigate his Begay claim.  We denied that 
relief, telling Doe he could file a timely § 2255 motion; four 
and a half months after our mandate issued in his appeal from 
the Rule 35 motion, he filed the 2012 motion.  Doe has taken 
every possible opportunity to press his case and thus satisfies 
the first prong of equitable tolling. 
As for the second prong, the question is whether his 
attorney’s error in dismissing his 2008 motion as meritless is 
the sort of “extraordinary circumstance” that entitles Doe to 
equitable tolling.  We have “rejected the argument that an 
attorney’s mistake in determining the date a habeas petition is 
due constitutes extraordinary circumstances for purposes of 
equitable tolling.”  Johnson v. Hendricks, 314 F.3d 159, 163 
(3d Cir. 2002).  The failure of Doe’s lawyer to anticipate 
Dorsey’s overruling is far less negligent than the error in 
Johnson v. Hendricks by a lawyer who miscalculated a well-
established deadline.  Indeed, Doe’s lawyer was not negligent 
at all.  And the failure to anticipate the change in the law did 
not impede Doe from directing his lawyer not to withdraw the 
motion; the colloquy at Doe’s Rule 35 hearing where Doe’s 
attorney withdrew the timely § 2255 motion to move forward 
with the Rule 35 relief suggests that Doe agreed with his 
lawyer’s strategy, although without completely 
comprehending the consequences of that assent.  Not 
anticipating a legal development, assuming it can even be 
considered a “mistake,” is just the sort of ordinary mistake 
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that courts have held insufficient for equitable tolling.  
Johnson, 314 F.3d at 163 (collecting cases). 
Moreover, while we regret misstating on his appeal 
from the Rule 35 hearing that Doe could file a timely § 2255 
motion after our remand, it is beside the point because, even 
at the time of our decision, the limitations period had long 
passed.  This is a case where a lawyer failed to foresee 
developments in the law, a circumstance far from 
extraordinary.  Therefore, even if we deem Doe’s 2012 
§ 2255 motion his first, it must be dismissed as untimely, and 
Doe can only win by obtaining Rule 60 relief from the 
withdrawal of his 2008 motion. 
VII. Was Doe Entitled to Rule 60 Relief?  
The District Court denied Doe’s request to reinstate his 
pro se motion on the ground that, because counsel was not 
ineffective in withdrawing the 2008 motion, Doe was not 
entitled to relief.  We believe the Court should have treated 
Doe’s request as a Rule 60 motion, and then should have 
asked whether the Rule 60 motion was a disguised second or 
successive motion and, if it was not, whether extraordinary 
circumstances justified granting relief.10 
                                              
10 Except in supplemental briefing we ordered, Doe does not 
bring up Rule 60 on appeal (he does argue that the pro se 
motion should have been reinstated, Opening Br. at 37, 38 & 
42).  The Government in its supplemental letter brief does not 
contend that a Rule 60 argument is waived, and we believe 
Doe may pursue it on remand.  Doe sought reinstatement of 
the 2008 motion in his brief in support of his 2013 
supplemental § 2255 motion.  The Court had granted 
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The question whether the Rule 60 motion is second or 
successive is close. The Supreme Court has held that when a 
motion asserts that “a subsequent change in substantive law is 
a reason justifying relief from the previous denial of a claim 
. . . [,] such a pleading, although labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, 
is in substance a successive habeas petition and should be 
treated accordingly.”  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 
                                                                                                     
reconsideration of its denial of the 2012 motion because Doe 
argued his lawyer had been ineffective in withdrawing the 
§ 2255 motion in 2008; the Court allowed Doe to present his 
arguments through new counsel (in support of the 2012 
§ 2255 motion).  The Court also ordered briefing on 
“ineffective assistance of counsel, as it relates to the grounds 
for denial of Defendant’s [2012 § 2255] Motion via this 
Court’s March 14 [2013] Order.”  ECF No. 82 at 1–2.  But 
Doe’s Motion for Reconsideration attacked counsel’s 
performance in 2008, and in any event counsel’s 
ineffectiveness has never been particularly relevant in this 
case, as Doe has no legitimate Strickland claim, nor has he 
defaulted any claim that ineffectiveness could overcome.  Cf. 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).  Because the 
confusion about the proper basis for reinstating the 2008 
§ 2255 motion may well have occurred at least in part 
because of the District Court’s order, we do not consider the 
Rule 60 argument waived. 
 Doe also argues that the pro se motion was in fact 
reinstated when the Court granted reconsideration of its 
denial of his 2012 § 2255 motion in order to appoint new 
counsel, but this argument is plainly wrong: the Court granted 
reconsideration only to allow Doe to present his arguments 
through a counsel he had not accused of inefficacy. 
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(2005).  At first glance, it would appear that Gonzalez 
forecloses Doe’s motion, for it arguably “attacks the federal 
court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.”  Id. at 
532 (emphasis removed).  However, in Cox v. Horn we read 
Gonzalez to hold that a change in the law “without more” is 
an inadequate basis for Rule 60 relief.  757 F.3d 113, 124 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  The approach in Cox calls for a remand to the 
District Court to determine if the “more” exists. 
“The fundamental point of 60(b) is that it provides a 
grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular 
case.”  Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“[C]ourts are to dispense their broad powers under 60(b)(6) 
only in extraordinary circumstances where, without such 
relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.”  Id. 
at 120.  And just as “we have not embraced any categorical 
rule that a change in decisional law is never an adequate basis 
for Rule 60(b)(6) relief,” id. at 121, it would be nonsensical to 
hold as a categorical matter that a person with constitutionally 
adequate counsel can never qualify for Rule 60(b) relief.  
“We have not taken that route.  Instead, we have long 
employed a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) 
motions . . . that takes into account all the particulars of a 
movant’s case.”  Id. at 122.  
The most relevant factor in this case is the change in 
law from Dorsey to Johnson.  But a change in decisional law, 
without more, is not enough to warrant Rule 60 relief.  Cox, 
757 F.3d at 115.  It is nonetheless an important factor, as is 
the significance of that change.  Johnson changed the 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines in an important 
way, but it was not an obviously constitutional decision nor a 
decision that made any conduct or activity legal that had 
previously been illegal.  That the law changed in a significant 
way cuts in favor of granting Rule 60 relief, but Doe will still 
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need to show “much more” to get relief.  Cox, 757 F.3d at 
115. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Doe’s diligence is also an “important factor” under 
Rule 60(b).  Id. at 126.  For the reasons discussed above in 
Part VI with respect to equitable tolling, Doe has been 
diligent in pursuing his rights.11 
Doe’s underlying claim’s merit is relevant, too.  Id. at 
124.  For the reasons discussed above in connection with his 
COA, it appears to us (at least from the record on appeal) that 
the Begay claim has merit.  Other relevant factors are the time 
between the dismissal of Doe’s § 2255 motion and his Rule 
60 motion and the nature of his sentence; here, it has been six 
                                              
11 The Government in its supplemental brief argues that if 
Doe’s 2012 motion is construed as a Rule 60 motion, it would 
be “untimely.”  Gov’t Supp. Br. at 4.  That contention is 
clearly wrong.  First, Rule 60(b)(6) has no built-in time limit.  
Second, the Government tries to argue that the 2012 motion 
was filed at an unreasonable time because it came 72 months 
after Begay, but the Government ignores that Doe first argued 
he was not a career offender before Begay came down and 
that he has since made repeated arguments both in the District 
Court and this Court to the same effect.  Finally, the 
Government claims that a five-month delay (here it is actually 
less) between our mandate on appeal from Doe’s Rule 35 
motion and his 2012 motion is unreasonable.  We disagree 
that, even if the Government were correct about the facts, five 
months to make a critical motion in a highly complex case is 
categorically unreasonable, particularly when the motion 
makes the same meritorious argument Doe has been making 
for years to no avail. 
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years since the 2008 motion was dismissed (though the lapse 
is largely due to the courts and not Doe), and he has been 
released from prison.  Yet his motion is not moot, as 
discussed above.  A final relevant factor is the allegation—
which will be for the District Court to credit or not—that Doe 
disagreed with his 2008 counsel on the subject of whether to 
withdraw the motion and allowed him to do so only because 
he was confused about the proceedings. 
These factors suggest that it would be within the 
District Court’s discretion to grant Rule 60 relief, but it is not 
so obvious that Doe deserves relief that we would direct that 
Court to do so.  We therefore vacate the denial of Doe’s 
request to reinstate his 2008 § 2255 motion and remand for 
consideration of all the relevant factors, including those 
factors the parties care to brief that we have not just 
discussed.   
But there are still more threshold issues that we must 
resolve to guarantee that remand is not a fool’s errand in case 
there is a bar to relief independent of everything discussed so 
far.12 
                                              
12 In a letter and response pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), 
the parties dispute whether the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) 
(holding that the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague), applies 
to the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
which uses very similar language to the ACCA.  We believe 
this issue is properly decided by the District Court in the first 
instance, assuming Doe obtains Rule 60 relief.  If the District 
Court reinstates his timely 2008 motion, Doe may seek to 
amend it to include the Johnson argument.  Because the need 
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VIII. Procedural Default 
The Government argues that Doe defaulted his claim 
by not raising it on appeal when its legal basis did not exist.  
We disagree.  If a claim is defaulted, the default may be 
overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice.  When the 
“legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 
counsel,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), 
there is “cause” for a procedural default; here prejudice is 
clear if the Begay claim is valid.  See English v. United States, 
42 F.3d 473, 479 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to object in the face 
of a “solid wall of circuit authority” contrary to movant’s 
position did not work a default); 2 FHCPP § 41.4[a] (“[T]his 
procedural bar is inapplicable to claims that could not have 
been raised on direct appeal.”). 
The Government also concedes that it did not rely on 
procedural default below, but it argues that we may reach the 
issue on our own accord.  For that proposition it cites Sweger 
v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 2002), a § 2254 case 
stating, among other things, that, in determining whether to 
consider an alleged default the Government has not raised, 
courts should consider “comity, federalism, judicial 
efficiency, and the ends of justice.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  At the outset, Sweger and decisions from 
other circuits holding that courts may raise procedural default 
sua sponte are in some tension with the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                     
to decide whether that case invalidated the career-offender 
provision depends on the interpretation of a very recent 
Supreme Court opinion and on how the District Court will 
exercise its discretion over any amendment that is sought, we 
believe it sensible to remand this case without addressing 
Johnson. 
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statement in Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165–66 
(1996), a § 2254 case, that “procedural default is an 
affirmative defense for the [Government].  If the . . . claim 
was addressed at some stage of federal proceedings, the 
[Government] would have been obligated to raise procedural 
default as a defense, or lose the right to assert the defense 
thereafter.”  And regardless of Sweger, § 2254 is sufficiently 
different from § 2255, where comity and federalism are 
irrelevant, that we join those circuits that have allowed courts 
to hold that the federal Government has waived or forfeited 
procedural default defenses.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cannady, 126 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 1997); Rogers v. United 
States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Shukwit 
v. United States, 973 F.2d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam); United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 995 (5th Cir. 
1992); see also 2 FHCPP § 41.7[b] n.20 (“Although some 
court decisions in the section 2254 context assert that 
considerations of comity may justify sua sponte judicial 
invocation of a procedural default even when the state’s 
representative fails to assert a default in a timely manner, 
such a rationale would appear to be inapplicable to section 
2255 proceedings.” (citations omitted)).  One crucial 
difference between §§ 2254 and 2255 is that § 2254(b)(3) 
expressly forbids federal courts from deeming the related 
exhaustion defense waived, and there is no parallel 
prohibition in § 2255, suggesting that in the § 2255 context 
Congress intended courts to use their traditional rules of 
waiver and forfeiture. 
Doe spills a great deal of ink arguing that 
ineffectiveness of his collateral review counsel can excuse 
any procedural default.  Br. at 43–53.  Because the claim is 
not defaulted and the Government waived this affirmative 
defense, Doe’s argument need not be addressed in much 
detail.  But we note that his attorney’s performance could not 
excuse a procedural default (if there were a default), as we 
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have held that failing to predict a change in the law is not 
deficient performance.  Sistrunk, 96 F.3d at 672.  We also 
point out that, to the extent Doe argues that ineffectiveness of 
collateral-review counsel can be an independent Sixth 
Amendment violation, see Br. at 53, this claim is a nonstarter.  
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (“There is no constitutional right to 
an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.  
Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” 
(citations omitted)).   
In any event, the claim is not defaulted, and, even if it 
were, the Government waived the defense of procedural 
default. 
IX. Retroactivity 
Begay was decided after Doe was sentenced, and 
therefore he can only benefit from the decision if it applies 
retroactively, meaning that those sentenced before Begay was 
decided may avail themselves of the rule of that case.  The 
Government concedes that it does, and we agree.  Gov’t Br. at 
64; see Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 625.13 
                                              
13 The Government argues that Begay is not “retroactively 
applicable” to Doe’s 2012 § 2255 motion because it is his 
second and is thus not allowed.  Gov’t Br. at 64–65.  This 
phrasing confuses two distinct issues, (1) whether a new rule 
of law is retroactive generally (usually because it is 
“substantive” or a “watershed rule of criminal procedure,” see 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (describing 
doctrine derived from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)), 
and (2) whether in a particular case a prisoner may benefit 
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X. Cognizability  
The Government argues that Doe’s Guidelines claim is 
not cognizable because it is neither constitutional nor the sort 
of “fundamental defect” that can be remedied under § 2255.  
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).  This is a 
difficult question and one that has divided the circuits.  We 
hold that it is cognizable. 
A. Supreme Court Guidance 
Before delving into the narrow question whether a 
challenge to the career-offender enhancement may be brought 
in a § 2255 motion that has no procedural defects, we review 
the Supreme Court’s guideposts for non-constitutional claims 
that are cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding.  As in many 
situations, the polar cases are easy.   
In Davis v. United States, an interpretation of the law 
handed down after the defendant’s conviction and appeal (the 
same interpretation Davis had advanced on the appeal that he 
                                                                                                     
from new law in a second or successive motion, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h)(2).  Under Teague, either a rule is retroactive or it 
is not.  By contrast, § 2255(h) imposes an independent bar for 
relief to the category of prisoners who have already filed one 
§ 2255 motion, and in the context of the second-or-successive 
bar the language of “retroactivity” is confusing and unhelpful.  
Our difference with the Government on this point may be 
semantic, but in this technical area of law it is best to be as 
clear as possible.  We agree with the Government that if 
Doe’s 2012 motion is second or successive, he cannot clear 
the § 2255(h)(2) hurdle, but, as discussed above, we assume 
that the 2012 motion was Doe’s first. 
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lost) rendered the defendant’s conduct no longer punishable, 
and therefore the Supreme Court held the conviction and 
sentence could be challenged via § 2255.  417 U.S. 333, 343 
(1974).  By contrast, in Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 
(1999), a district court failed to inform a criminal defendant 
of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; Peguero did not appeal, and he sought to 
have his appellate rights reinstated on collateral review.  
Despite his failure to appeal and his lawyer’s lack of advice 
on that right, record evidence made it clear that the defendant 
had independent knowledge of his right to appeal.  The 
Supreme Court held that the District Court’s noncompliance 
with the formal requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure could not support a basis for collateral relief when 
the movant failed to bring his claim on direct appeal, and, in 
any event, he suffered no prejudice from the error.  Id. at 27–
28. 
The lead case for filling in the space between these 
poles is Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994).  Although Reed 
was a § 2254 case, it was pre-AEDPA, when the cognizable 
claims under §§ 2254 and 2255 were coextensive.  Davis, 417 
U.S. at 343.  Under Reed, § 2255 relief is available for 
nonconsitutional claims to remedy “a fundamental defect 
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice 
[or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands 
of fair procedure,” 512 U.S. at 348 (alteration in original), or 
when “aggravating circumstances” make “the need for the 
remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus . . . apparent,” 
id. at 350.  Examples of “aggravating circumstances” include 
“[v]iolations of statutes as to which nationally uniform 
interpretation is particularly important” and “[p]rejudice to 
important interests of the incarcerated petitioner.”  1 FHCPP 
§ 9.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  For example, in 
Peguero, 526 U.S. at 24–28, the Supreme Court held that 
because of the “general rule, that a court’s failure to give a 
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defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient 
basis for collateral relief only when the defendant is 
prejudiced by the court’s error,” a “district court’s failure to 
advise a defendant of his right to appeal as required by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” can “provide[] a basis 
for collateral relief” only if the movant “suffered . . . 
prejudice from the omission.” 
With these guideposts in mind, we turn to the circuit 
courts that have faced the same question presented here: 
whether a challenge to the career-offender Guidelines 
enhancement is cognizable in a § 2255 motion. 
B. Seventh Circuit 
In Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (2011), with 
facts similar to those here, a defendant was classified as a 
career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Because 
that classification was no longer valid after Begay, Narvaez 
brought a § 2255 motion.  The Seventh Circuit acknowledged 
the “general rule” that sentencing errors are not cognizable on 
collateral review yet held that the case before it “present[ed] a 
special and very narrow exception: A postconviction 
clarification in the law has rendered the sentencing court’s 
decision unlawful.”  Id. 674 F.3d at 627.  The Court surveyed 
the five cases where the Supreme Court had considered “the 
issue of whether a non-constitutional, non-jurisdictional error 
is a miscarriage of justice on collateral review,” id. at 627 
n.11.  In four of the cases, procedural error did not amount to 
a miscarriage of justice, but in Davis (the case where a 
subsequent change in decisional law rendered defendant’s 
conduct lawful) the Supreme Court held that “[t]here can be 
no room for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results 
in a complete miscarriage of justice and present[s] 
exceptional circumstances that justify collateral relief under 
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§ 2255.”  417 U.S. at 346–47 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
For the Seventh Circuit, the difference between Davis 
and the other key cases meant that new procedural rules could 
not support a § 2255 claim, while new substantive ones could.  
Narvaez relied on Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 415 
(7th Cir. 2010)—a case that held Begay retroactive because 
its new interpretation of the ACCA was “substantive”—to 
extend the reasoning in Davis to Narvaez’s case.  In 
particular, the Narvaez Court held that the difference between 
a ruling that limits the amount of punishment that can 
lawfully be imposed for given conduct and a ruling that 
makes punishment impermissible altogether is “one of 
degree, not one of kind.”  Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 628.  The 
Court also analogized the situation of Narvaez to one who has 
been sentenced on the basis of materially false information, a 
well-established due-process violation.  Townsend v. Burke, 
334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).  The Court concluded, “To classify 
Mr. Narvaez as belonging to this group [career offenders] and 
therefore to increase, dramatically, the point of departure for 
his sentence is certainly as serious as the most grievous 
misinformation that has been the basis for granting habeas 
relief.”  Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629.  Narvaez has been limited 
to cases decided (as occurred to Doe) under the mandatory 
Guidelines.  Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 822–23 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
C. Fourth Circuit 
In Whiteside v. United States, a panel of the Fourth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit.  
748 F.3d 541, 543–54 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d on other 
grounds, 775 F.3d 180 (2014) (en banc).  The Whiteside 
Court first reasoned that the defendant’s failure to take a 
direct appeal of his career-offender designation did not 
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foreclose collateral review.  It acknowledged that Whiteside 
“would likely be entitled to a vacated sentence” were the case 
now on direct appeal, id. at 554, but at the time of 
Whiteside’s conviction pre-Begay Circuit precedent would 
have barred his argument and rendered direct appeal fruitless.  
That the procedural posture of Whiteside’s case depended 
less on the presentation of his claims than on the timing of the 
Court’s own decisions “contribute[d] to the conclusion that 
denial of review [on collateral review would] operate[] a 
complete miscarriage of justice.”  Id.  As the Court put it, 
“[Whiteside] should not be punished—and we mean literally 
punished, as in additional time spent in federal prison, time 
which the law does not countenance—for th[e] fact” that he 
was sentenced pursuant to case law that the Court only 
repudiated after the time for a direct appeal had elapsed.  Id.  
Next, the Court relied on Peugh v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2072 (2013), which held that application of a later 
edition of advisory Guidelines recommending a higher 
sentence than the edition in print at the time of the crime 
violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.  The 
Whiteside Court cited Peugh for the propositions that 
Guidelines challenges can be constitutional (thus cognizable 
on collateral review) and that principles of fairness and justice 
should inform whether a defendant “was subject to a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”  Whiteside, 748 F.3d at 
554.  The Court concluded that, because of Begay, Whiteside 
was “not a career offender, and he should not serve a sentence 
that was based on his classification as one.”  Indeed, such a 
sentence is a fundamental miscarriage of justice.  Id.  The en 
banc Fourth Circuit reversed the Whiteside panel but did not 
address cognizability.  775 F.3d 180.  
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D. Eleventh Circuit 
The panel decision in Gilbert v. United States, 609 
F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 
640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), used yet another 
line of reasoning to conclude that wrongful career-offender 
enhancements are cognizable on collateral review, 
considering the enhancement to be in substance a crime: “For 
federal sentencing purposes, the act of being a career offender 
is essentially a separate offense, with separate elements (two 
. . . convictions[] for violent felonies), which must be proved, 
for which separate and additional punishment is provided.”  
(The Seventh Circuit echoed this reasoning in determining 
that challenges to career-offender status are cognizable under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 
2013).)  Because Gilbert was “actually innocent” of being a 
career offender, he could challenge his sentence collaterally.  
Gilbert, 609 F.3d at 1165.  The Eleventh Circuit en banc 
reversed the panel’s decision, as it concluded the motion in 
question was a second or successive one, but it expressly 
reserved whether Gilbert’s claim could have been brought in 
a first § 2255 motion.  Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 
1293, 1306 & n.13 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
E. Eighth Circuit 
Although a panel of the Eighth Circuit also held that 
Begay error was cognizable on collateral review (following a 
similar line of reasoning as did the Seventh Circuit), the en 
banc Court reversed.  Sun Bear v. United States, 611 F.3d 
925, 931 (8th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc).  The en banc decision is straightforward: because 
the defendant’s sentence was statutorily authorized, there was 
no miscarriage of justice, and his claim was not cognizable on 
collateral review (even though he was sentenced pursuant to 
the mandatory Guidelines).  Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705. 
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F. Our Dicta 
In Cepero, we faced a question of Guidelines 
interpretation and held that we lacked jurisdiction over the 
appeal because it was not a constitutional issue.  We then 
“confront[ed] the specter that Congress has now differentiated 
between the type of § 2255 petition that may be filed in 
district court and the type that may be appealed to this court.”  
Cepero, 224 F.3d at 265.  We acknowledged that “[s]ection 
2255 petitioners may allege and have adjudicated non-
constitutional issues in district court.”  Id.  In coming to this 
conclusion, we relied on the statute providing that “[a] 
prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by 
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or 
correct the sentence.”  Id. (emphasis in original); accord 
United States v. Gordon, 172 F.3d 753, 754 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(“Congress, in enacting § 2253(c)(2), differentiated between 
the type of petition that can be filed and the type that can be 
appealed.  Petitions may be filed in district court alleging 
violations of the Constitution or federal law. The claims may 
only be appealed, however, if they involve the denial of 
constitutional rights.” (citation omitted) (emphases in 
original)).  Even if the advisory Guidelines are arguably not 
“law,” there is no doubt the mandatory Guidelines were.  
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005).  The 
discussions in Cepero and Gordon strongly suggest that any 
violation of the “laws of the United States” is cognizable (and 
therefore that Guidelines error is too), but the analyses are 
dicta, as those cases turned on the appealability of claims 
rather than their cognizability in the district courts.   
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G. The Government’s Argument 
The Government has an impressively long string cite 
for the proposition that “federal appellate courts . . . faced 
with the question of whether an error in calculating the 
Guidelines is cognizable on post-conviction collateral 
review[] have ruled consistently that they are not.”  Br. at 37.  
Surprisingly, only two of the twelve cases the Government 
cites—Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 & United States v. 
Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999)—actually 
support this proposition.  The others are not relevant, as either 
they do not discuss the cognizability of sentencing errors in 
§ 2255 motions before district courts, United States v. 
Manigault, 395 F. App’x 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2010), or they 
stand for the proposition that sentencing errors that were 
defaulted at sentencing or on direct appeal may not be 
brought for the first time in a § 2255 motion.  Graziano v. 
United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam) (“Insofar as claims regarding a sentencing court’s 
error in failing to properly apply the Sentencing Guidelines 
are neither constitutional nor jurisdictional, we join several 
other circuits in holding that, absent a complete miscarriage 
of justice, such claims will not be considered on a § 2255 
motion where the defendant failed to raise them on direct 
appeal.”); Scott v. United States, 997 F.2d 340, 340 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“In 1990 Phillip D. Scott was sentenced to 57 months’ 
imprisonment.  He did not appeal.”); Hill, 368 U.S. at 425 
(“There was no appeal.”); Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 
769, 771 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Knight did not appeal from his 
federal sentence.”); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 
490, 492 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Neither Mikalajunas nor Largent 
pursued an appeal.”); United States v. Kinder, 69 F.3d 536 
(5th Cir. 1995) (not precedential) (per curiam) (unclear 
whether Kinder appealed his career offender designation, see 
United States v. Kinder, 980 F.2d 961, 962 (5th Cir. 1992)); 
Gibbs v. United States, 655 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 2011) 
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(“Gibbs acknowledges that he failed to raise his U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1 claim on direct appeal and that the claim is therefore 
procedurally defaulted.”); Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 
1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he appeal was dismissed 
pursuant to Burke’s motion for voluntary dismissal.”); United 
States v. Coley, 336 F. App’x 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (“Coley did not raise this issue on direct appeal. In 
fact, it appears that he filed no direct appeal at all.”).  For the 
reasons discussed above, Doe has not defaulted his Begay 
claim, and therefore the Government’s cases (with the 
exception of Sun Bear and Williamson) are not on point. 
The Government also strenuously argues that there is 
no reason to think that Doe would receive a reduction in his 
sentence were he resentenced because it filed an information 
under 21 U.S.C. § 851 that enhanced Doe’s statutory 
sentencing range based on his prior drug conviction to a 
mandatory minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life.  But 
the Government ignores that Doe was sentenced at the bottom 
of the mandatory Guidelines range (262 months) and that the 
Court at sentencing expressed its regret that the Guidelines 
forced it to impose such a high sentence.  Tr. 13:15–19, S. 
App. 155 (“[T]here is not much room for discretion here.  
There is a guideline sentence that I am required to follow 
under the law and it’s a very stringent sentence.  It is very 
strict and it’s very, very difficult to impose.”).  As discussed 
above regarding mootness, even though Doe could receive the 
same sentence on remand, the available facts suggest the 
likely outcome is otherwise. 
H. Synthesis   and   Conclusion   With  Respect  to  
  Cognizability 
The Government does not seriously grapple with the 
precise issue here, which is whether erroneous sentencing as a 
career offender is cognizable on collateral review, not 
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whether any Guidelines error can be raised on § 2255.  We 
have no precedential opinion on either question (though, as 
noted above, dicta from Cepero supports Doe), and there is a 
circuit split on the former one. 
We hold that the claim is cognizable, at least in cases 
arising under the mandatory Guidelines.  In reaching that 
conclusion, we do not adopt wholesale the reasoning of any 
of the circuit courts that have so held; instead, we start from 
the Supreme Court’s guidance in Reed and Peguero.  The 
former case stands for the proposition that a nonconstitutional 
error can be cognizable in the presence of “aggravating 
factors.”  Peguero allows for claims attacking a district 
court’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure when those claims prejudice the defendant.  We 
believe the incorrect computation of a mandatory Guidelines 
range based on misclassification of the defendant as a career 
offender is at least as serious as the error discussed in 
Peguero and thus should also be cognizable where the 
mistake prejudices the defendant.   
This holding is consistent with the dicta of Cepero.  
We further agree with the Narvaez Court that substantive 
error, like more time in prison, is doubtless more serious than 
procedural error, like failure by a court to advise someone of 
appellate rights (the claim in Peguero).  And as Narvaez 
recognizes, § 4B1.1 “involves the classifying of an individual 
as belonging to a subgroup of defendants, repeat violent 
offenders, that traditionally has been treated very differently 
from other offenders.”  674 F.3d at 629.  However, unlike 
Narvaez, we do not read the Supreme Court’s cases as having 
drawn a bright line between, on the one hand, procedural 
(therefore not cognizable) claims, and, on the other, 
substantive (hence cognizable) ones.   
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Further, the Whiteside Court was correct to draw some 
support from Peugh.  Although, as a direct appeal about an ex 
post facto challenge to wrongful calculation of the advisory 
Guidelines, Peugh is entirely distinguishable from Doe, the 
case does acknowledge the importance, even the primacy, of 
the Sentencing Guidelines to criminal defendants.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court cautioned courts that 
“sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines,” 
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083, that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines 
represent the Federal Government’s authoritative view of the 
appropriate sentences for specific crimes,” id. at 2085, and 
that “the range is intended to, and usually does, exert 
controlling influence on the sentence that the court will 
impose.”  Id.  This description carries even greater force in 
the context of mandatory Guidelines because before Booker 
the Guidelines “ha[d] the force and effect of laws,” United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005).  
Booker and Peugh render implausible the en banc 
Eighth Circuit’s analysis that if a sentence is statutorily 
authorized, even if not allowed by the mandatory Guidelines, 
it is categorically legal and therefore cannot be challenged on 
collateral review.  We look to the actual world of sentencing, 
which before Booker and even today relied far more heavily 
on the Guidelines than on statutory ranges.  Moreover, and 
more importantly, the Supreme Court has not taken such a 
categorical approach to cognizablility on collateral review, as 
it has strongly suggested, if not held, that collateral challenges 
to applications of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are 
permitted where the movant has been prejudiced.  In short, 
Reed’s recognition that nonconstitutional error may be 
cognizable in § 2255 proceedings, Peguero’s 
acknowledgement that prejudicial violations of the Rules of 
Criminal procedure are cognizable, Cepero’s dicta that any 
violation of the “laws of the United States” may be corrected 
on collateral review, Booker’s emphasis that the mandatory 
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Guidelines are law, Peugh’s understanding that even the 
advisory Guidelines exert considerable force over sentencing, 
and the significance of a career-offender designation, lead us 
to conclude that misapplication of the mandatory career-
offender Guideline, when such a misapplication prejudices 
the Defendant, results in a sentence substantively not 
authorized by law and is therefore subject to attack on 
collateral review where the claim is not defaulted.   
Our holding is narrow, and we do not consider 
challenges to the advisory Guidelines, procedural Guidelines 
error, provisions other than career-offender designation, 
defaulted claims, or Guidelines errors that do not cause 
prejudice. 
XI. Savings Clause 
We note one final issue that the parties do not brief: 
§ 2255 is not a complete substitute for a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Section 2255(e), 
referred to as the “savings clause,” provides that “[a]n 
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner 
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to 
this section[] shall not be entertained . . . unless it . . . appears 
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention.”   
We do not decide here whether Doe could properly 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but we note that Doe’s 
situation seems to fall between two of our cases.  Compare In 
re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (prisoner 
may petition for habeas when intervening Supreme Court 
case rendered conduct of which he was convicted no longer 
criminal), with Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 
(3d Cir. 2002) (prisoner may not petition for habeas where 
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intervening Supreme Court case changed the identity of 
factfinder and burden of proof on facts affecting sentence). 
 The Seventh Circuit in a case with factual similarities 
to this one held that the second-or-successive bar rendered 
§ 2255 inadequate to challenge a sentence after Begay when 
the petitioner’s first § 2255 motion was brought at a time 
when our Third Circuit precedent foreclosed his argument.  
Brown, 719 F.3d at 588.  (Seventh Circuit law governed the 
§ 2241 petition because Brown was incarcerated in Indiana; 
the § 2255 motion was governed by our law, as Doe was 
convicted in Pennsylvania.)  However, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the same argument in Gilbert.  640 F.3d at 1295.  We 
do not decide which of these cases we believe is correct. 
XII. Conclusion 
Doe argued that he was not a career offender before 
Begay came down.  He was right when his lawyer, the 
District Court, and our Court were wrong.  After the Supreme 
Court clarified the law, the District Court, our Court, and 
Doe’s lawyer persevered in our error.  We caused unfortunate 
and unwarranted hope by informing Doe in his appeal from 
the Rule 35 motion that he could still bring a timely § 2255 
motion.  We regret that this case proves wrong Justice 
Holmes’s optimistic statement that collateral review “cuts 
through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.  
It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the 
proceedings, and although every form may have been 
preserved, opens the inquiry whether they have been more 
than an empty shell.”  Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 
(1915) (Holmes, J. dissenting).  AEDPA’s procedural 
obstacles hobble the meritorious and frivolous claims alike; 
while they have not stopped Doe, they may yet, and in any 
event they have slowed his progress considerably.  We vacate 
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the judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings. 
